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Abstract 
This article is the first known study assessing the relationship between the experiences of the 
philanthropic venture capital firm’s founding team, and their venture firm’s economic, social, 
and total performance. Results indicate that commercial and social experience help economic 
and social performance respectively. However, when pursuing the maximization of both 
social and economic performance, philanthropic venture capital firms perform best when the 
founding team has high levels of commercial experience and low levels of social experience.  
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Introduction 
Social entrepreneurship is a way of addressing societal needs through the employment 
of economically sustainable market strategies, which facilitate organizational longevity 
(Austin, Stevenson, and Wei-Skillern, 2006). However, focus on both social and economic 
outcomes creates organizational tension (Moss, Short, Payne, and Lumpkin, 2011; Santos, 
2012). On the one hand, the commercial activity might reduce attention to the firm’s social 
mission, leading to mission-drift. On the other hand, too much emphasis on the social mission 
might, instead, lead to overlooking the economic factors that ensure financial sustainability. 
Because of this organizational tension, social entrepreneurship has attracted scholarly 
attention and evolved into a new field of study (Short, Moss, and Lumpkin, 2009).  
Philanthropic venture capital (PhVC) is a new and innovative funding approach for 
social enterprises (SEs). PhVC applies the traditional venture capital (TVC) investment 
model (Gompers and Lerner, 2001; Tyebjee and Bruno, 1984) to the funding needs of SEs 
(Letts, Ryan, and Grossman, 1997; Scarlata and Alemany, 2010). PhVC firms seek 
investments that are efficient, economically sustainable, and have measureable social impact. 
As such, just like the SEs they fund, PhVC firms are subject to organizational tension 
between their social mission and their economic objectives. 
Additionally, the PhVC industry is still relatively young and small. Historically, it 
emerged in the late nineties during and after the dot.com boom. Dissatisfied with the results 
obtained by traditional forms of charity to support social causes, many successful high-tech 
entrepreneurs adopted the principles and discipline of TVC. A report by the European 
Venture Philanthropy Association [EVPA] (2012) indicates that the total funding available in 
Europe alone for PhVC investing in 2011 amounts to €3.86 billion, with a median fund size 
of €11 million. Despite the fact that the PhVC industry has existed for more than fifteen 
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years, it is still in its early stages of development, with many firms that are small and 
struggling for survival (EVPA, 2012). Today, across both the U.S. and Europe, we have 
identified 70 independent PhVC firms (i.e., firms started by individuals, as opposed to being 
part of a larger institution, such as a bank or a corporation).  
Although the PhVC industry is poised for high growth, it remains largely under-
researched. Little is known about what it takes for PhVC firms to become successful, 
especially in light of the dualistic and competing nature of their organizational objectives. 
While we know that the knowledge created through experience matters for firm performance, 
this research has primarily focused on organizations pursuing economic returns, such as TVC 
firms (Dimov and Shepherd, 2005; Walske and Zacharakis, 2009; Zarutskie, 2010). 
O'Donohoe, Leijonhufvud, Saltuk, et al. (2010) suggest that PhVC firms need to be 
financially proficient and, at the same time, knowledgeable about the peculiarities of socially 
driven endeavours. The question, therefore, becomes whether both experience in commercial 
and social endeavours aid PhVC firms that seek dual performance outcomes.  
Following the lead of studies in TVC that examine how prior founder experience 
impacts firm performance (Dimov and Shepherd, 2005; Walske and Zacharakis, 2009; 
Zarutskie, 2010), this research is the first attempt to delineate which experiences influence 
PhVC firm performance using a quantitative approach. Specifically, this article looks at 
whether the dualistic nature of founders’ experience, garnered either in the commercial 
sector, social sector, or a combination of the two, leads to better investment performance. By 
delving into this topic, we inform scholars and practitioners alike about the success factors 
required to maximize both economic and social return in firms with dual objectives.  
This article adds to the literature in a number of ways. First, entrepreneurship research 
on organizations pursuing dual objectives has mainly been conceptual and qualitative (Short, 
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et al., 2009; Dacin, Dacin, and Matear, 2010; Austin, et al., 2006). While quantitative studies 
have analyzed the distinctive elements of social vs. commercial ventures (Moss, et al., 2011) 
or, very recently, validated measures of the economic and social component of SEs’ mission 
(Stevens, Moran and Bruneel, 2014), our article is the first known quantitative study to assess 
the total performance of dual objective organizations, using  the total performance measure 
conceptually elaborated by Zahra, Gedajlovic, Neubaum, et al. (2009) and Emerson (2003). 
Second, beyond including traditional measures of commercial experience, we introduce and 
build an empirical measure for social experience and assess its effect on economic, social, 
and total firm performance. Third, given that PhVC is an emerging and fast growing field, it 
is likely that new firms will be formed in the coming years. As such, we provide early 
evidence as to which types of experience are most common and which relate to firm success. 
This is particularly interesting for investors committing capital to PhVC.  
The article is structured as follows. First, we use Human Capital (HC) Theory 
(Becker, 1964) to hypothesize how founder experience impacts firm performance. Second, 
we present the methodology applied to test these hypotheses, including sources and 
descriptions of the data. Third, we share the results of our empirical analysis and discuss 
findings. Last, opportunities for future research are discussed. 
The influence of experience on firm performance 
The role of prior individual experience has long been of interest to HC Theory 
(Becker, 1964). According to Becker (1964), investments in HC – typically conceptualized as 
education and work experience – drive the formation of knowledge and skillset. The 
combination of knowledge and skills allow individuals to successfully perform relevant tasks, 
ultimately improving their economic conditions.  Organizational scholars have further argued 
that HC, accrued through task-specific experiences, helps top managers select the knowledge 
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most relevant for firm success, especially in cases where experience is both firm and industry 
specific (Kor, 2003).  As such, variation in firm performance is driven by differences in the 
HC stock (Bamford, Dean and McDougall, 1999; Beckman and Burton, 2008) and the 
specific and, often, tacit knowledge base this creates (Polayni, 1966).  
In the entrepreneurship context, the experience garnered by new firms’ founders 
creates knowledge bundles that lead to the identification and exploitation of different 
entrepreneurial opportunities (Beckman and Burton, 2008; Beckman, Burton and O’Reilly, 
2007). Furthermore, the influence of firm founders is especially important in young firms, as 
a) these firms are striving to overcome their liability of newness (Stinchcombe, 1965), and b) 
these early “imprints” shape future hiring and strategy (Beckman and Burton, 2008), creating 
a lasting influence on organizational evolution (Boeker, 1989) and performance (Gimeno, 
Folta, Cooper, et al., 1997).  
While investigating experience in TVC firms, Dimov and Shepherd (2005) and 
Zarutskie (2009) prove that past work experience creates tacit knowledge and domain 
familiarity that helps investors develop accurate perceptions of risk, return, and investment 
opportunities. This accuracy, in turn, maximizes the TVC firm’s economic performance. 
PhVC firms also follow the investment practices and techniques of TVC firms in that they 
screen and actively manage their portfolios of investments (Letts et al., 1997; Scarlata and 
Alemany, 2010).  Also similar to TVC, PhVC organizations are “top heavy,” with 
organizational decisions and strategies being determined by a handful of senior partners, and 
in our case, given the newness of the PhVC industry, founding partners.  
In contrast to TVC firms, PhVC firms and the SEs that they invest in, are also 
concerned with “value creation,” pursuing both social and economic aims (Santos, 2012; 
Austin et al, 2006). PhVC firms strive to garner a high social return on their investments by 
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backing organizations that both develop socially innovative market solutions and 
simultaneously employ economically sustainable market strategies.  This is in contrast to 
TVC firms, which focus on what Santos (2012) defines as “value capture” (i.e., the 
appropriation of economic returns only). In other words, PhVC firms invest in social 
entrepreneurs who combine both social and economic goals when pursuing a particular 
entrepreneurial opportunity (Zahra et al., 2009), representing a combination of “Richard 
Branson [serial entrepreneur, founder of Virgin Group, including Virgin Atlantic Airlines and 
Virgin Records music label] and Mother Teresa [Catholic beatified nun who established 
hospices and homes for the poor and the sick in India, Nobel Prize for Peace in 1997] 
(Schwab, 2009).”    
Research on TVC firms has identified several prior experiences helpful in obtaining 
superior economic performance. Walske and Zacharakis (2009) and Zarutskie (2010) show 
that past VC experience builds knowledge that enhances the firm’s ability to raise capital, as 
the founder can point to prior investment success. Prior VC experience also aids founders in 
selecting higher quality investments and in knowing how to actively monitor them. Dimov 
and Shepherd (2005), Walske and Zacharakis (2009), and Zarutskie (2010) further indicate 
that finance experience facilitates the structuring of VC investments, as it offers a rich 
understanding of market dynamics and financial instruments. Prior VC and finance 
experience is important in fundraising, deal structuring, and the monitoring of investments, as 
well as negotiating subsequent rounds of investments with future co-investors (Walske and 
Zacharakis, 2009). In contrast, entrepreneurial experience helps when advising the investee 
on how to adapt to unexpected market developments. Entrepreneurship experience also 
potentially mitigates agency risk; investors who are former entrepreneurs are better able to 
detect opportunistic behavior amongst their investees. Finally, senior management experience 
helps VCs counsel their entrepreneurs on how to scale and grow their organizations, 
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ultimately resulting in increased portfolio firm value (Walske and Zacharakis, 2009; 
Zarutskie, 2010).    
PhVC firms also want their investments to perform economically, ensuring that they 
are, at a minimum, economically self-sustaining. As such, commercial experience is helpful 
when advising portfolio companies on revenue generation strategies, deemed necessary to 
drive economic sustainability and, ultimately, ensure the SE’s survival. Mair and Marti 
(2009) further stress the importance of economic sustainability, arguing that commercial 
practices are a necessary condition for the viability of firms that pursue both commercial and 
social objectives. Therefore, we argue that commercial experience is necessary for the PhVC 
firm’s economic performance, leading to the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: PhVC founders that have higher levels of commercial 
experience have better economic performance, than PhVC founders that have 
lower levels of commercial experience. 
In comparison to TVC, PhVC firms’ founders have much higher levels of social 
experience, garnered in socially related endeavors (Scarlata, Zacharakis, and Walske, 2011). 
Such experiences are valuable because they demonstrate the PhVC firm founders’ 
commitment to the social mission of their investing activity. This, in turn, builds a PhVC 
firm’s credibility (Moss et al., 2011), creating a narrative through which social progress can 
be demonstrated, over time (Nicholls, 2009). Beyond being consistent with the firm’s 
mission-related investment strategy, social experience creates a better understanding of the 
motivations and actions necessary to successfully address social problems.  As such, 
experience garnered within government or development agencies enhances the PhVC 
founders’ knowledge about the peculiarities of the sectors which generate positive 
externalities and improve social welfare, (e.g., education and health). Since governments 
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highly influence the process of societal change, either by dictating the rules of the social 
sector, or by creating an ecosystem that finances it, knowing how the government thinks and 
operates is important to investors in the social sector.  This experience ultimately helps with 
gaining knowledge on the ways through which funding for scaling up initiatives with social 
causes is ultimately deployed.  
At the same time, “governments often do not have enough knowledge to act, even when 
they have the resources and motivation to do so (Santos, 2012: 342).” Therefore, government 
experience should be accompanied by other social experiences. King (2004) argues that the 
management of a nonprofit organization offers first-hand experience in the daily challenges 
that managers have to face while solving social problems. Having such experience allows 
founders to develop a deeper understanding of the societal challenges and the effectiveness of 
social programs (Oster, 1995). We extend this thinking to suggest that the founding of an 
organization with a primary social aim further builds knowledge of how to address social 
causes through innovative strategies and solutions. Having these types of experiences may 
also allow individuals to more aptly mobilize ideas, capacities, and resources that are 
required in sustainable social transformations (Alvord, Brown, and Letts, 2004). This leads to 
the formulation of the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: PhVC founders that have higher levels of social experience will 
have better social performance than PhVC founders with lower levels of social 
experience. 
Although PhVC firms seek both economic and social objectives, they do not look at 
these as separate objectives. PhVC firms, like the SEs they back, pursue simultaneous 
economic and social objectives (Chell, 2007). This requires possessing knowledge derived 
both from commercial and social environments. While there is scant literature on how 
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commercial and social experience can be combined into a single measure of performance, our 
argument is that if commercial experience spurs economic sustainability, and social 
experience cements a firm’s commitment to its chosen social cause, then having both should 
lead to better total firm performance.  
Building on hypotheses one and two, we expect that social experience, in conjunction 
with commercial experience, will further improve the PhVC firms’ overall performance, as 
per the following hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 3: PhVC founders that have higher levels of commercial and social 
experience have better total performance than PhVC founders with lower levels 
of commercial and social experience.  
Methodology 
To test our hypotheses, we focus on independent PhVC firms (i.e., firms started by 
individuals) and exclude non-independent firms (i.e., corporate and captive firms), consistent 
with research on independent TVC (Walske and Zacharakis, 2009). To identify PhVC firms, 
the following criteria had to be met: a) investments must be directed towards SEs; b) both 
capital and value-added services must be provided to investees; c) social return measurement 
must be reported to their investors [as O’Donohoe et al. (2010) indicate, investors often use 
proprietary social performance measurements]; and d) the investment firm must market itself 
as addressing social issues.  
Because PhVC is still an emerging industry, no official list of firms exists. We 
scanned several published sources including both U.S. and European PhVC firms. PhVC 
firms were mainly identified through the U.S. National Venture Capital Association (NVCA, 
2012) and the European Venture Philanthropy Association (EVPA, 2012). To minimize 
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potential under-coverage error, the previously identified PhVC firms were cross-referenced 
with the Morino Institute (2000) list for the United States and the John (2006) list for Europe. 
Further, to ensure that we included the fullest possible population of PhVC firms in our 
dataset, we used a snowball sampling approach, asking those identified in these various lists 
and directories to identify additional firms that were not listed by these sources.  
Through this process, we identified organizations that are highly engaged with SEs 
but do not formally invest capital in them (e.g., consultancy firms and networks), and 
eliminated these non-investing organizations from our final population. After careful 
examination, we finalized a dataset of 70 PhVC firms, of which 26 are based in the U.S. and 
44 in Europe. Given the emerging state of the PhVC industry, the population of active PhVC 
firms coincides with the population of first-time PhVC firms; these are all PhVC firms with 
first time funds. While the mean founding year was 2002 for our population of PhVC firms, 
one firm was started in 1981. This firm has an evergreen fund, meaning that, despite its age, 
it is still a first-time fund. We ran tests, including and excluding this firm, and results were 
consistent in both cases. We kept this PhVC in our dataset to ensure the largest possible 
number of firms.   
Due to a lack of public databases on PhVC, data on founders’ experience was 
collected using the PhVC firm’s website. We then consulted professional networks (e.g., 
LinkedIn and ZoomInfo) to further capture PhVC firm founders’ prior work experience. Data 
on performance was collected in 2012 through a questionnaire, which was administered 
either by phone or email, depending on the interviewee’s preference. We asked respondents 
about the economic and social performance of their portfolio of investments. We obtained 43 
complete usable responses, corresponding to 61 percent response rate. Of these, 13 firms are 
based in the U.S. and 30 firms are based in Europe. Descriptive statistics of the population of 
PhVC firms and respondents are reported in Table 1. The mean founding year of the PhVC 
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firms was 2002 vs. 2003 for the respondent sample. Also, 1.471 founders started PhVC firms 
in the total population of firms, vs. 1.488 founders in the respondent sample. For experience, 
the population of PhVC firms shows 2.4 founders with commercial experience vs. 1.0 with 
social experience. These figures become 2.534 and 1.114 for commercial and social 
experience, respectively, for respondents. 
------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
------------------------------------- 
We performed different tests to determine potential non-response bias. In our dataset, 
the variables available for the entire population were: the number of founders; the year the 
firm was created, commercial experience, and social experience. We performed a Chi-square 
test for difference on means, medians, and proportions for each of these variables. The Chi-
Square test was statistically insignificant, suggesting that non-respondent PhVC firms do not 
differ from respondent firms. To address Oppenheim’s (1992) concern related to late 
respondents being similar to non-respondents, we compared early respondents to late 
respondents, on the basis of the variables used to compare respondents and non-respondents. 
According to Oppenheim (1992), respondents are considered to be late when their response is 
obtained only after the first reminder. In addition, a test including the experience variables 
(which were available for both early and late respondents) was also conducted. The results 
from the Chi-square tests indicate that early respondents do not significantly differ from late 
respondents.  
Measures and Analysis 
To test our hypotheses, commercial experience is measured at the firm level using the 
sum of prior work experiences of all firms’ founders, in keeping with prior management 
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research (Beckman and Burton, 2008; Carpenter, Pollock and Leary, 2003; Walske and 
Zacharakis, 2009). Commercial experience types are those found in published TVC research 
(Dimov and Shepherd, 2005, Walske and Zacharakis, 2009, Zarutskie, 2010), including: VC; 
entrepreneurial; financial; senior management; and consulting experience. VC experience 
indicates that the person has previously worked in a TVC firm. Finance experience includes 
investment banking; options trading; foreign exchange management; commercial banking; 
and mutual fund portfolio management. Entrepreneurial experience was defined as founding 
a commercially motivated enterprise. An individual was coded as having senior management 
experience if she had been a Chief Executive Officer (CEO), Chief Operating Officer (COO), 
Chief Strategy Office (CSO) or a Chief Financial Officer (CFO). Consulting experience 
includes prior work in strategic and management consulting firms.  Each founder received a 
“1” for each experience type consistent with prior HC research (Beckman and Burton, 2008; 
Carpenter, et al., 2003). 
Social experience, at the firm level, is measured as the sum of the following prior work 
experiences of all the firms’ founders: positions within government or government agencies; 
management of an enterprise with a social aim; and founding of an enterprise with a social 
aim. An individual is coded as having government experience if she worked for a government 
branch or for international governmental organizations aimed at promoting economic 
development and social progress. Experience managing an organization with a primary social 
aim (either a non-profit, for profit or hybrid) includes individuals who were previously 
employed by such firms. These experiences are coded as “management of an enterprise with 
a primary social aim” akin to the term “senior management experience” which was used for 
coding one of the components of the commercial experience construct. Experience founding 
a non-profit organization or a SE is coded as “founding of an enterprise with a primary social 
aim,” akin to “entrepreneurial experience,” used in coding commercial experience. The 
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coding process followed what was done for the measures related to the commercial 
experience construct, with founders receiving a “1” for each experience type, in keeping with 
prior research (Beckman and Burton, 2008; Carpenter, et al., 2003). 
We measure total performance dependent variable (DV) following Zahra et al. (2009) 
who present a comprehensive framework for evaluating organizations pursuing dual 
objectives. Zahra et al. (2009) propose the use of a total performance measure, which is 
captured by summing its economic and social components. This is consistent with Chell 
(2007) and Emerson’s (2003: 38) blended value concept, based on “the core nature of 
investment and return is […] the pursuit of an embedded value proposition composed of both 
[economic and social return].” Our total performance variable is as follows: 
Total performance = (Economic performance + Social Performance) 
Consistent with the argument that SEs must become economically sustainable (Letts 
et al., 1997), we measure economic performance as the extent to which the PhVC investor’s 
portfolio has achieved economic sustainability at the time of the questionnaire. Using such a 
measure, rather than return on investment (as typically done in TVC research), allowed us to 
collect data from the entire spectrum of the PhVC value proposition, including those seeking 
a high economic return, as well as those seeking no economic return. However, all PhVC 
firms want their investments in SEs to be economically sustainable. For both for-profit and 
non-profit organizations, economic sustainability relates to reallocating assets and resources 
in order to seize opportunities and react to unexpected threats while maintaining general 
operations of the organization (Bowman, 2011). As such, economic sustainability refers to 
having economic conditions that allow SEs to survive over the long-term.  
The social entrepreneurship literature suggests that SEs can undertake both the non-
profit and for-profit organizational form (Austin et al., 2006; Dees, 1998). In the case of non-
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profit SEs, we define economic sustainability as a non-profit’s ability to earn income by 
selling products or providing services to communities in need, rather than by relying on 
grants alone. Economic sustainability is thereby represented by the relative percentage of 
income that is garnered by such activities, typically unrestricted, as opposed to the income 
earned through grants, which are typically restricted (Alter, 2000; Bell, Masaoka, 
Zimmerman, 2010; Gras and Mendoza, 2014). This is consistent with Sontag-Padilla, 
Staplefoote, and Gonzalez Morganti (2012) who find that one of the major challenges for 
non-profits is a total reliance on external project funding. Grants often have considerable 
restrictions on how funds can be utilized, and rarely support general operations and 
administration. They are also often granted for a relatively short period of time, such as one 
or two years (Letts et al., 1997). Therefore, a dependency on grants alone can create 
organizational vulnerability and increase its likelihood of failure. If the SE undertakes a for-
profit or hybrid organizational form, we define economic sustainability as the ability of the 
investee to generate a positive cash flow (McMullen and Dimov, 2013). 
Consistent with prior research, SEs combine existing resources in new and/or 
different ways to address social causes (Alvord et al., 2004; Bornstein, 2004; Brinkerhoff, 
2001; Dees, 1998; Mair and Marti, 2006; Reis, 1999). Therefore, we measure social 
performance as the extent to which the portfolio SEs have been able to spur social innovation 
(Alvord, et al., 2004; Austin et al., 2006; Leadbeater, 2007; Luke and Chu, 2013; Mulgan, 
2007; Shaw and de Bruin, 2013). Social innovation is defined as the SE’s ability to create and 
bring to market new products and services that benefit society at large (Alvord et al., 2004). 
For both our economic and social performance indicators, investors were asked to rate their 
current investments using a seven-point Likert scale. Both of these measures were collected 
through the questionnaire sent to founders and executives of PhVC firms.  
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We control for four variables available for all respondents. First, we control for the 
size of the PhVC firm (measured as natural logarithm of number of portfolio companies). 
Second, given that ecology theorists suggest that older and larger firms have a greater chance 
of survivorship (Freeman, Carroll, and Hannan, 1983), we control for firm age.  Third, we 
control for whether the firm has its headquarters in Europe or the United States. Last, we 
control for the PhVC firm’s value proposition – defined as the extent of the firm’s pursuit of 
social and economic return. This is consistent with prior research that shows that PhVC 
firms’ value proposition ranges across a continuum of social and economic return (Scarlata, 
Alemany, and Zacharakis, 2012). Some PhVC firms are “social first,” and measure success 
purely by social returns. An example of such a firm is the New Schools Venture Fund, a U.S. 
based PhVC firm that aims to transform the public education system for low-income children 
(New Schools Venture Fund, 2013). Other PhVC firms emphasize the need for the 
redistribution of economic returns to their investors, over their fund’s social return. An 
example of such a firm is Lift Investment Partners, a U.S. based PhVC firm, which invests in 
ventures to grow them to scale and return capital, alongside any appreciation, to its investors 
(Lift Investment Partners, 2013). In the middle lie firms such as Acumen Fund, a U.S. based 
PhVC firm that aims to create both social impact and an economic return, using all 
investment proceeds to fund future investments (Acumen Fund, 2013).  
In the questionnaire, value proposition was measured as an ordinal variable ranging 
from 1 to 3, with 1 = Economic return is our priority, 2 = Social and economic return are 
equally important, and 3 = Social return is our priority. Respondents were therefore asked to 
indicate what value proposition best described their activity. Results (reported in Table 2) 
indicate that respondents are in the blended performance spectrum, which equally emphasizes 
economic and social return (mean of respondent sample = 2.302). 
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------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
------------------------------------- 
We then ran OLS regressions to test our hypotheses. We treated the Likert scale of the 
DVs as continuous variables, consistent with prior research (Carifio and Perla, 2007; 
Jamieson, 2004). Tests indicate the absence of multicollinearity across all models reported. 
The value of the Variance Inflation Factors across the different models presented in the next 
section range between 1.5 (for the model including control variables only) and 1.9 (for the 
full model), well below the cutoff value of 5 or 10 suggested in prior research (Hair and 
Anderson, 2010).  
We performed several robustness checks of our results. First, we addressed 
endogeneity, which could affect our analysis and lead to biased OLS estimates. In our 
context, the question is whether the effect of experience on performance might be due to a 
“selection” effect, where founders with greater levels of commercial experience might be 
more likely to report higher economic performance in their portfolio of investments, for 
example. By doing so, they would send a signal that their lower levels of experience in the 
social sector, as shown by Table 2, does not negatively impact their investment performance. 
If non-random, it is possible that the independent variable, commercial experience, is 
correlated with the regression error term, leading to biased OLS estimates. We therefore 
implemented a two-stage least square (2SLS) instrumental variable regression, which 
requires using an instrument that is not correlated with the error term, but that is correlated 
with the independent, endogenous variable to be instrumented. Consistent with prior research 
and the argument that the higher the number of founders with commercial experience, the 
higher the firm’s economic performance (Adams, Almeida, and Ferreira, 2003, 2005; Bruton, 
Chanine, Filatotchev, 2009), we used the number of founders as an instrument for 
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commercial experience. This is consistent with results by Beckman and Burton (2008) and 
Patzeltz (2010) showing a positive significant correlation between number of founders and 
commercial experience.  
The first stage of 2SLS provides an estimate for the endogenous variable and indicates 
the strength of the instrument being used. Based on Stock, Wright, and Yogo (2002), strength 
can be measured by the F statistic which should be higher than 10 for strong instruments. In 
our case, the F statistic from the first stage regression of 2SLS used to instrument commercial 
experience through number of founders, showed a value of F = 11.31, p<.05. This indicates 
that number of founders is a strong instrument. 
Second, to deal with a potential concern related to performance being influenced by 
the extent to which the investor can add value to their portfolio companies (Cumming, 2006; 
Cumming and Johan, 2007; Kanniainen and Keuschnigg, 2004), we used average number of 
portfolio SEs per founder as control variable. Third, to alleviate concerns related to the 
presence of one outlier in our respondent sample, we a) ran a quantile regression, and b) 
winsorized the variable “Age,” (i.e., the variable characterized by the presence of the firm 
started in 1981). Across these robustness checks, results were consistent with those reported 
in Table 3.  
Results 
Table 2 provides the descriptive statistics and correlations for the variables used, 
specifying the mean and standard deviations. Results show that both commercial and social 
experience is present among PhVC firms’ founders. However, founders in our sample have 
more commercial than social experience (mean of 2.534 vs. 1.114 respectively). In addition, 
seven of these firms had founders with no commercial experience vs. eight firms with 
founders showing no social experience. However, T-tests indicate that the difference between 
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respondent firms whose founders have neither social nor commercial experience, compared 
to respondent firms with founders having both, are not statistically significant.   
In Table 3, we provide the results of the OLS and 2SLS full-models estimation for 
economic, social, and total performance. Results across OLS and 2SLS methods are 
consistent with one another. Results indicate that commercial experience is positively and 
significantly affecting economic performance (β = .337, p<.05). A one standard deviation 
increase in commercial experience causes a 0.337 increase in the economic sustainability of 
the PhVC firm’s portfolio of investments. This provides support for Hypothesis 1 which 
predicts that commercial experience leads to higher economic performance.  
------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here 
------------------------------------- 
For social performance, results indicate a positive effect of social experience (β = 
.313, p<.1), consistent with Hypothesis 2. One standard deviation increase in social 
experience causes a 0.313 increase in the social performance of the PhVC firm’s 
portfolio of investments in SEs.  
When firms pursue the simultaneous maximization of economic and social return, 
or total performance, our results indicate that social experience is both a significant and 
negative moderator for total performance (β = -.203, p < .05), providing no support to 
Hypothesis 3. As such, a one standard deviation increase in both commercial and social 
experience causes a 0.203 decrease in the total performance of the PhVC firm. Results 
are consistent across OLS and 2SLS tests, indicating that our results are not affected by 
endogeneity. This strengthens the view that when PhVC firms’ founders pair 
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commercial and social experience, total performance suffers. This is counterintuitive 
and the opposite of what was predicted by Hypothesis 3.  
To further understand why the combination of social and commercial experiences 
negatively influence total performance, we parsed out the main effect of commercial and 
social experience, and their interaction, on total performance, as shown in Figure 1. The 
effect of social experience on total performance was plotted considering two different 
combinations of commercial and social experience: high commercial – low social, and low 
commercial – high social.  This further analysis explains the variation in our correlation 
tables as the relationship between experience and total performance is positive when 
commercial experience is high and social experience is low. On the contrary, total 
performance is significantly lower when social experience is high and commercial experience 
is low. This leads to a novel and nuanced finding: commercial and social experiences are 
both positively correlated with PhVC total performance, but only when commercial 
experience is high and social experience is low.   
------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
------------------------------------- 
Discussion and Implications 
This study examines the effects of founder experience on firm-level economic, social, 
and total performance within organizations pursuing both economic and social returns.  It 
addresses the following research question: what types of founder’s experiences in firms 
pursuing economic and social objectives best aid total firm performance? To answer this 
question, we analyze performance factors in the context of PhVC firms, whose primary 
activity lies in investing capital and providing strategic advice to SEs. We also ask which 
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experiences, garnered prior to founding a PhVC firm, most aid firm performance. To do so, 
we ran our empirical analysis using European and American investing PhVC firms, which 
invest across the entire social-economic performance spectrum.  
We find that individuals who start a PhVC firm tend to have more experience in the 
commercial (i.e., TVC, finance, senior management, consulting, and entrepreneurship 
experience), rather than the social sector (i.e., government experience, the 
management/creation of an organization with a primary social aim). By aggregating a range 
of founder experiences, based on their commercial or social nature, we find that experience is 
indeed a strong predictor of economic performance, consistent with prior TVC work by 
Dimov and Shepherd (2005) , Walske and Zacharakis (2009) and Zarutskie (2010). 
Specifically, we find that PhVC firms started by individuals with more commercial 
experience are more likely to hold a portfolio of investments in SEs that are more 
economically sustainable. This provides support for Hypothesis 1.  
Empirical results also suggest that social experience alone strongly predicts the 
performance of firms when they seek to maximize social performance, consistent with 
Hypothesis 2. This indicates that the tacit knowledge developed through social sector 
experiences are of key importance for the performance of firms active in such contexts. 
Although not formally hypothesized, results in Table 3 also suggest that commercial 
experience alone indeed improves social performance. However, coupling social with 
commercial experience significantly decreases the social performance of the PhVC firm’s 
portfolio. Perhaps, the challenges of translating and integrating, simultaneously, knowledge 
accrued both through commercial and social experience into projects purely focused on social 
returns is insurmountable. This is in line with Ancona and Caldwell (1992) who argue that 
the heterogeneity of experiences may impede the exchange and understanding of relevant 
information, which relate to the use of different narratives, vocabularies, and objectives. 
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The empirical evidence indicates that when firms pursue singular objectives, either 
economic or social, context specific experience helps (i.e., strong commercial experience 
leads to better economic performance and strong social experience leads to better social 
performance). However, contrary to our expectations, coupling commercial with social 
experience actually undermines total performance. Although relevant knowledge in both 
commercial and social domains accentuates the PhVC firms’ pursuit of dual objectives, 
having too much social experience makes investments less economically sustainable and, in 
turn, less successful.  Investments that are not economically viable do not survive in the long 
run, thus limiting the SE’s social impact (Morino, 2000; Letts et al., 1997). As Morino (2000) 
states, too much social experience creates firms more focused on the pursuit of social 
objectives, at the expense of their own survivorship. Further, too much of a social focus may 
result in non-economically sustainable organizations that cannot scale, thus limiting their 
efficiency and efficacy both at an economic and social level (Letts et al, 1997). Lastly, it is 
important to remember that PhVC firms are investment vehicles, making the economic and 
social performance of their funds of utmost important to their financial backers. Indeed, our 
results indicate that total performance (i.e., blended economic and social performance) is 
driven more by its economic component and by context specific commercial experience. 
These results support HC theory, in that context specific experience is key to firm 
success (Becker, 1964) when PhVC firms pursue economic returns. However, we challenge 
the assumption that firms pursuing dual objectives need to possess dual types of experiences 
with equal amounts of both commercial and social experiences. As reported by prior studies, 
different experiences increase the firm’s ability to take actions and respond to change (Chen 
and Macmillan, 1992). This is consistent with Eisenhardt (1989) in that differing knowledge 
stocks can impede a firm’s responsiveness to environmental factors, negatively impacting 
firm performance. Applying these arguments to the context of PhVC firms, our results show 
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that equal amounts of both commercial and social experience does not improve total 
performance. Further, our work suggests that the tacit knowledge gained by PhVC firms’ 
founders in the social sector alone, while relevant for maximization of social performance, 
does not increase a firm’s total performance. In essence, more social experience is not better; 
however some social experience, coupled with higher levels of commercial experience, leads 
to superior total performance within PhVC firms.  
Implications and suggestions for further research 
Extant research has focused on investing firms that pursue an economic return on 
investments (Dimov and Shepherd, 2005; Walske and Zacharakis, 2009; Zarutskie, 2010). 
Another stream of literature has examined organizations that pursue a social objective, 
mainly in the non-profit domain, which has implicitly assumed that economic indicators can 
measure social performance (e.g., Forbes, 1998; Ritchie and Kolodinsky, 2003). In the 
entrepreneurship literature, research on social entrepreneurship has been mainly conceptual 
(Emerson and Twersky, 1996; Emerson, 2003; Zahra et al., 2009) or qualitative (cfr. Short, et 
al., 2009; Dacin, et al., 2010). Our work is the first known quantitative research that 
conceptualizes and measures social experience.  We then perform the challenging task of 
measuring total performance, when firms have the dual objective of economic and social 
return maximization.  Building on prior conceptual work in the entrepreneurship literature, 
we empirically measure and implement, for the first time, a total performance indicator that 
includes both economic and social parameters.  
While we find that PhVC firms are started by few individuals with relatively low 
commercial and social experience, the knowledge they gained though such experience indeed 
leads to better economic, social, and total firm performance. Our data further reveals caveats 
around combining commercial and social experience. Firms whose founders possess both 
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commercial and social experience, in equal amounts, fail to deliver when performance 
expectation blends both economic and social performance. These results are due to the 
challenges associated with integrating knowledge stocks developed in two different and, 
often, mutually exclusive endeavours (i.e., commercial and social) which are characterized by 
their own narratives, language, and practices. Given that total PhVC performance is driven by 
economic rather than the social component, we suggest that high levels of commercial 
experience is critical to the success of PhVC firms.  Also, because SEs do not rely solely on 
grants or donations to fund their operations, but instead implement market-based approaches 
to solve social problems, investors need to have knowledge on how these operations should 
be designed and implemented.  They also should be able to advise SE’s on how to improve or 
modify their business model, if necessary. Therefore, SEs that fail to achieve economic 
sustainability are more likely to be unsuccessful portfolio firms, in turn, leading to less 
successful PhVC firms. However, PhVC firms need a little social experience to understand 
and support the mission of the SEs in which they invest.  In sum, higher commercial mixed 
with lower social experience leads to the higher total performance of PhVC firms. 
With respect to total performance, we find that a small level of social experience is 
quite beneficial. As such, the knowledge created though social experience must be evaluated 
more deeply so that we can: a) understand what types and amount of social experience is 
most correlated with high total performance b) identify which social experiences are best  
coupled with commercial experiences; b) evaluate the extent to which alternative 
explanations could drive the negative effects of social experience on total performance, (e.g., 
entrenched founders who “hire” prominent persons with a high social profile to attract fund 
inflows, but are not prepared to identify, invest and advise the best SEs); and c) more deeply 
understand what types of commercial experience best aid firm performance. Future research 
could therefore tease out which commercial experiences drive firm performance at the 
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economic, social, and total level. Finally, further analysis could determine if all experiences 
included in the social experience construct negatively influence overall performance. 
Considering that the current population and sample is small, it is difficult to empirically test 
these sub-components. Qualitative research could lead to a more nuanced understanding of 
which social and commercial experiences are most essential in dual objective firms.  
Our findings also indicate that while extant research focuses on identifying 
differences and similarities between dual and single objective organizations (Austin et al., 
2006; Miller and Wesley, 2010; Moss, et al., 2011), we need a better understanding of how 
economic and social experiences relate and influence total organizational performance. In 
fact, studying organizations that simultaneous pursue economic and social objectives is fertile 
ground to test and improve upon well-known entrepreneurship and management theories 
(Santos, 2012).  While dual-purpose organizations put equal emphasis on commercial factors 
and social factors (Miller and Wesley, 2010; Moss, et al., 2011), our research shows that 
pursuing dual organizational objectives does not require equal stocks of knowledge (Dierickx 
and Cool, 1989). This could create new areas of study for researchers interested in identifying 
efficient ways to allocate both human and financial resources for social causes.   Our results 
are also relevant for practitioners. If their objective is to put financial resources into the best 
performing PhVC investment vehicles, they would have to look for those firms where 
founders have high commercial but low social experience. For prospective PhVC firms’ 
founders, instead, individuals should be looking to create founding teams who hold more 
experience in the commercial sector. Those interested in creating a PhVC firm should also be 
wary of having a dominant level of founder experience in the social sector.  
The findings suggest that a higher balance of commercial experience versus social 
experience is essential to PhVC firm success challenging the assumption that to be successful 
in PhVC, social experience is more important than commercial experience. Typically, there is 
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an emphasis on social experience, as it is commonly thought that such experience creates an 
understanding of the dynamics, narratives, and challenges within the social sector. While 
possessing some social knowledge is helpful, and likely motivates a person to work in PhVC, 
commercial experience is essential to achieving total performance returns. A better 
understanding of who are the founding partners of PhVC firms is additionally beneficial to 
those social entrepreneurs seeking capital. Typically, entrepreneurs do better when backed by 
higher performing investment entities, as successful investors become a source for capital in 
future fundraising rounds (Walske, Zacharakis, and Smith-Doerr, 2007).  
Aside from contributing to the emerging field of PhVC, there are some limitations to 
our study that need to be considered. First, the population of PhVC firms is very small, and 
has limited operating histories. Although our sample includes 61 percent of the PhVC 
population, the size of our sample does not allow for fine-grained analysis of all IV’s that we 
would have preferred to test. For example, we could have divided firms based upon their 
expectations around social and economic return, focusing only on a particular investor 
category (i.e., finance first, social first, or equally weighted finance and social return 
emphasis). Given the small population of PhVC firms in each investment category, it is 
difficult to quantitatively test each of the three firm categories. Second, while we have strived 
to identify all active PhVC firms, our dataset might not be complete. We conducted several 
Internet searches and reached out to industry associations and networks, to ensure as 
complete a sample as possible. Third, our measurement of experience variables is subject to 
self-reporting bias. It may be that the difference at the commercial and social experiences 
level is affected by the decision of the founder to report only those experiences deemed to be 
relevant. For example, philanthropic activity may be under-reported by founders at PhVC 
firms if they view this as unpaid, volunteer work, and not a legitimate part of their work 
history.  Fourth, while we capture the different types of experience that founders possess, we 
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cannot capture how many years of each type of experience each founder holds.  Similar to 
past work in TVC HC (Dimov and Shepherd, 2005; Walske and Zacharakis, 2009; Zarutskie, 
2010), we are limited to types of experience possessed and not the relative strength (as 
measured in years) for each experience type.  Considering that 42 percent of the PhVC 
sample consists of firms started by one founder, the overall sample has relatively lower 
experience counts in both commercial and social experience.  It may be that the optimal 
strategy for PhVC success is to have multiple founders with complementary experience.  
Future qualitative research could clarify this issue further.   
A final limitation of our work lies in a somewhat subjective measurement of social 
and economic performance, given that the data is self-reported. Future research might look 
into social and economic performance by employing quantifiable and objective measures of 
social return. Since there is no industry or academic standard to measure social performance, 
we had investors rate their portfolio firm performance using Likert scales. The use of external 
measures can be incorporated into follow-on research, once they are developed and 
implemented more widely and consistently in the field of social finance and social 
entrepreneurship. 
Conclusion 
In closing, our results indicate that PhVC firm total performance is influenced 
mainly by its economic component which, in turn, is driven by commercial experience; 
PhVC firm founders with high levels of commercial experience improves total PhVC 
performance. Finally, combining both commercial and social experience is detrimental 
to a PhVC firm’s total performance, if founders hold high levels of both experience 
types. Instead, our plots indicate that when commercial experience is high, and social 
experience is low, total performance for PhVC firms is the highest. Through this 
research we delineate the experiences that best correlate with firm performance in dual 
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objective organizations. These findings are a significant contribution to the knowledge 
base around PhVC, not only for academicians, but also for the investor in PhVC firms, 
for the founders of PhVC firms, and for social entrepreneurs seeking capital from 
PhVC firms. 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics of PhVC firms – Population and respondents. 
 
 Population Respondents 
 n Mean Median Min Max SD n Mean Median Min Max SD 
Year 70 2002 2003 1981 2011 5.369 43 2003 2004 1981 2011 5.372 
Number of founders 70 1.471 1.00 1 4 0.689 43 1.488 1.000 1 3 0.631 
Commercial experience 70 2.400 2.000 0 8 2.152 43 2.534 2.000 0 8 2.208 
Social experience 70 1.000 1.000 0 5 1.174 43 1.114 1.000 0 5 1.283 
 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics and correlations. 
 n Mean St. Dev 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1 Economic performance 43 4.698 .320 1.000           
2 Social performance 43 6.000 .199 -.228 1.000          
3 Total performance 43 10.698 2.199 .820*** .369* 1.000         
4 Commercial experience 43 2.534 2.208 .163 .099 .098 1.000        
5 Social experience 43 1.114 1.283 -.288 -.042 -.331** .049 1.000      
6 Ln Portfolio size 43 3.006 1.583 -.031 .167 .068 -.191 -.076 1.000      
7 Firm age 43 2003 5.374 .175 -.223 .036 .024 -.001 -.701*** 1.000     
8 Value proposition 43 2.302 .558 .141 -.066 .096 .059 .106 .074 .103 1.000    
9 Ln Number of founders 43 .397 .392 .256 .068 .160 .485** .014 -.057 .063 -.136 1.000   
10 Location 43 .674 .474 .138 -.078 .086 -.194 -.002 -.140 .194 .111 .023 1.000  
11 Ln Size (Capital)  38 16.083 2.448 -.123 .210 .011 -.236 -.162 .423** -.138 .022 .206 -.199 1.000 
***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.1 
39 
 
Table 3: OLS regressions for economic, social, and total performance (full models). 
 Economic 
performance 
Social 
performance 
Total performance 
 OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS 
Commercial experience .337** 1.155**  .298* .383* .599** 1.483** 
 (.199) (.544) (.098) (.218) (.196) (.604) 
Social experience -.144 .526 .313* .488** .058 .852 
 (.357) (.596) (.167) (.244) (.353) (.667) 
Commercial experience 
x Social experience 
-.012 
(.091) 
-.359 
(.183) 
-.087** 
(.041) 
-.139** 
(.068) 
-.203** -.474** 
     (.089) (.204) 
       
Ln Portfolio size .316 .001 .218 .244 .279 .429 
 (.283) (.001) (.129) (.124) (.287) (.375) 
Firm age .126 .140 -.045 -.007 .047 .057 
 (.084) (.091) (.039) (.037) (.087) (.109) 
Value proposition .352 .391 -.141 -.103 .118 -.020 
 (.575) (.609) (.292) (.277) (.571) (.726) 
Location .541 1.171 -.056 .103 .502 1.134 
 (.710) (.853) (.343) (.364) (.699) (.968) 
Constant -251.223 -280.716 14.019 17.080 -87.032 -108.553 
 (168.633) (181.492) (78.669) (73.692) (174.277) (220.808) 
       
N 43  43  43  
R2 .241  .209  .312  
Adj. R2 .089  .073  .169  
***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.10 
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Figure 1: Interaction effect of commercial and social experience on total performance. 
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